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This paper examines the normative foundations of fiscal equalization – an issue handled, apparently 
decisively, in a classic paper by James Buchanan (1950). Contrary to Buchanan's claims, we argue 
that fiscal equalization requires extremely strong value judgements – at least in the case where fiscal 
differences arise from the interaction of public goods provision under different population size – 
effectively committing one to a Rawlsian maximin rule. Much weaker forms of the 'social welfare 
function' in this public goods case will generate the requirement that private consumption levels be 
equalized, but specifically not public consumption levels – in which sense private goods equalization 
seems normatively weaker than public goods equalization, If this is so, the hope of justifying federal 
fiscal equalization on the basis of relatively uncontroversial individualistic norms seems illusory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Half a century ago, in a paper now possessing the status of a classic, James 
Buchanan (1950/2001) developed a case for fiscal equalization among subsidiary 
units of a federal polity, on the basis of an apparently widely accepted normative 
principle – that of "horizontal equity." Buchanan's stated purpose in his paper 
was not so much to derive a justification for fiscal equalization from first 
principles, as it was to investigate whether such a justification might be 
constructed in strictly individualist terms. However, his apparent success in 
finding such an individualist-based justification, and one that rests on what 
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appear to be quite uncontroversial premises, has been widely accepted as 
establishing a robust case for federal fiscal equalization. As Buchanan puts it, 
"An inter-governmental transfer system can be worked out which 
would allow state units originally unequal in fiscal capacity to provide 
equal services at equal rates of taxation... An...important objection to the 
statement of the policy goal is that it appears in terms of adjustment 
among organic state units. Equality in terms of states is difficult to 
comprehend, and it carries with it little ethical force for its policy 
implementation... If the inter-state differences in fiscal capacity can be 
traced through to their ultimate impact upon individuals, and a policy 
formulated in inter-personal terms, it would seem that greater support 
could be marshalled for inter-state fiscal equalization" (2001:7). "The 
equity principle presented here (...the central tenet of equity in the sense 
of 'equal treatment for equals' (2001:7)) ...offers an objective which, if 
accepted, can serve as the basis for the development of a rational inter-
governmental fiscal adjustment system" (2001:22). 
Over the intervening fifty years, there has been virtually no literature that we 
know of that has taken issue with Buchanan's central claims. In that sense, 
there appears to be a solid consensus within the public finance profession that 
there is a persuasive general a priori case for fiscal equalization. 
In this paper, we want to investigate Buchanan's endorsement of an "inclusive 
horizontal equity principle" (IHEP) within the federal setting. The IHEP, as 
here understood, is the principle that individuals who pay identical taxes should 
receive identical total benefits from government sources, irrespective of the 
sub-national jurisdiction in which they happen to reside. More strictly, 
individuals' "fiscal residuals" should be independent of sub-national location 
(though those residuals may of course differ for other reasons). 
Throughout this investigation, we adopt the two central features (as we see it) 
of Buchanan's general framework: 
 Individuals are taken to be the ultimate entities for which 
considerations of 'equalization' are relevant. Sub-national jurisdictions 
in a federal system will, through their various fiscal activities, affect 
the positions of their citizens, but those jurisdictions do not have any 
intrinsic status as independent claimants of equality. 
 The situation of individuals on the basis of which claims of 
equalization are to be assessed includes both the tax and the 
expenditure side of fiscal operations. Specifically, "horizontal equity" 
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is to be thought of in terms of 'fiscal residuals' – public sector benefits 
net of taxes – and not just in terms of taxes alone. 
Buchanan's argument is developed in terms of an extended example in which 
differences between sub-national jurisdictions arise from different average 
incomes in those jurisdictions. Buchanan compares the situations of two 
individuals who pay the same aggregate taxes (state and federal) but receive 
different levels of public goods supply, according to whether they reside in a 
higher income or a lower income jurisdiction. This difference involves violating 
horizontal equity requirements (as expanded by Buchanan) across the inclusive 
polity. Accordingly, simply by appeal to that horizontal equity principle, we can 
justify inter-jurisdictional transfers without seeming to have to settle more 
contentious issues of distributive justice at the inter-personal level. 
"... a formal solution to the fiscal problem of federalism can be worked 
out. This allows the problem to be isolated and separated from the 
much more difficult one of the distribution of fiscal burdens and 
benefits among unequals" (2001:8). 
However, Buchanan's particular example deals with only one possible source 
of difference in inter-jurisdictional fiscal residuals. Clearly, fiscal differences can 
also arise from differences among jurisdictions in the cost of producing 
equivalent services. And fiscal differences arising from this source are more 
complicated. In fact, fiscal equalization to deal with the effects of cost-
differences turns out to demand extremely strong norms of justice – stronger 
ones than those required for the equalization of private incomes. In other 
words, the IHEP, understood as a general principle, turns out to be extremely 
demanding. Buchanan's claim that the issue of inter-jurisdictional transfers can 
be “isolated and separated” from what he takes to be the “much more difficult one” of 
interpersonal transfers seems to be just dead wrong in these cases. As a general 
proposition, federal fiscal equalization in general requires much stronger norms 
of (individual) redistributive justice than do inter-personal transfers. 
We shall develop our argument for the case where such cost-differences arise 
from economies of scale associated with differential populations. In particular 
our example will focus on the case in which the goods provided by sub-national 
jurisdictions are "public" across jurisdictions in the Samuelsonian sense. In this 
setting, the level of public goods benefit that each resident of a jurisdiction 
receives is positively related to population size. The question to be posed in this 
range of cases is that of just how strong the underlying ethical commitments 
would have to be in order to justify fiscal equalization across jurisdictions. 
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As we shall show, however, our general claims accommodate the case where 
State-provided goods are less than fully public and also the case where there 
are net congestion effects (so larger population reduces per capita benefit). 
Provided population makes a difference to the level of public expenditure 
benefit, our basic conclusions go through. And indeed, they seem to us to go 
through for any case where inter-jurisdictional differences relate to differential 
costs in providing equivalent public goods benefits. 
Or at least, that is what we here argue. The central example we appeal to is 
developed in section 2. We then generalize that example somewhat in Section 3. 
Section 4 is a summary of the main results. 
2. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE  
2.1. THE SETTING 
There are two communities, L and S. Average private goods income per capita 
is identical in the two communities, but L has twice as many citizens as S. Both 
community governments provide a public good, G, which is public (in the 
standard Samuelsonian sense) within each community, but where there are no 
spillovers between jurisdictions. Each jurisdictional government is assumed 
to provide G in optimal amounts for its jurisdiction. The utility function for 
each individual in L and S is assumed to be the same, and can be expressed 
over the two goods, X (private) and G (public). 
To simplify, we abstract from any direct spending activities pursued by the 
'central' federal jurisdiction. And we assume that there is no mobility between 
the two communities. We also abstract from any distortions in private choices 
associated with the taxing process. 
Because G is public within jurisdictions, each resident of L will, at the same 
tax rate, receive twice as much G as does each resident of S. Of course, there is 
no requirement that S and L will actually impose the same tax rate. After all, 
the cost to each L resident of an extra unit of G is half the cost to each S 
resident. In the special case where the elasticity of demand for the public good 
is unity, the L's will choose twice the quantity of G that the S's choose, and tax 
rates will indeed be identical. But whatever the precise tax regime, each 
individual in L will be better off than each in S: the residents of the larger 
jurisdiction will consume more public goods at lower per capita tax cost than 
do residents of the smaller jurisdiction. 
Clearly, in the absence of any intergovernmental grants between L and S, this 
arrangement will violate the 'inclusive horizontal equity principle.' The IHEP 
will require that residents of S and L have the capacity to consume the same 
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(X,G) combination. We interpret the IHE principle here in terms of capacities, 
because any requirement of identical consumption of X and G across 
jurisdictions of differing size would ignore the fact that public goods are per 
capita cheaper in one jurisdiction than in the other and hence would leave all 
residents worse off than they might otherwise be. 
Suppose for example that the common utility function for each individual is 
of the Cobb-Douglas form. And further suppose (just for ease of calculation) 
that the proportion of total income spent on the public good is 50% at 
optimality. So, in S: 
(1)  2/12/1 SSiiS GXU =  
Where i is a resident of jurisdiction S.  
And in L:  
(2)  2/12/1 LjLjL GXU =
 
where j is a resident of jurisdiction L. 
Suppose without loss of generality that the per-unit cost of the public good is 
one unit of X forgone. And to simplify let us suppose that L consists of two 
persons and S of only one person. 
On this basis, we can appeal to a simple diagram to indicate the relative position 
of the S-citizen and the two L-citizens, and the fiscal equalization required to 
place all three persons in equivalent positions. In Figure 1, we depict the X,G 
consumption possibilities for the relevant persons. The level of G-consumption 
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is depicted on the horizontal axis, and level of X-consumption on the vertical 
axis. Each individual has access to the same maximum level of X-consumption, 
namely X. Given that there is only one person in S, consumption possibilities in S 
are given by XS in Figure 1. The slope of XS is -1, reflecting the unitary price of G 
in terms of X forgone. Consumption possibilities for the typical resident of L are 
depicted by XL, reflecting the fact that private goods endowments are equal but 
that the price of G to each citizen of L is half that in S. That is, OL is twice OS. 
Recall our assumption that politico-fiscal processes within states are such as 
to generate optimality for their residents. On this basis, the state equilibria 
will be: ES in S and EL in L. All individuals will be facing the same (50%) tax 
rate, all paying identical taxes (XX*) and all consuming the same post-tax quantity 
of private good, X*. But citizens in L will be better off than the citizen in S, 
because the former will consume twice as much public good: OGL is twice OGS. 
2.2. FISCAL EQUALIZATION 
In order to meet the IHE criterion, it will be necessary to transfer from L to S 
resources so that all individuals have access to the X,G combination at point C 
in Figure 1. Since OGL = 2.OGS , the amount to be transferred from L to S is  
l/2.[OGL – OGS] or 1/2.OGS (of which each of the two citizens of L will pay 
one-half). So the post-equalization transfer will involve the S citizen having 
consumption possibilities X^S^, and each of the L citizens having consumption 
possibilities X~L~. Of course, faced with those consumption possibilities, 
citizens will not remain at C in either jurisdiction. The post-equalization 
equilibrium will be at S* in jurisdiction S and L* in jurisdiction L. But it is 
obvious that these points involve roughly equal utility levels and that 
everyone is better off than they would be at C. 
So far, there is no significant departure from the Buchanan formulation. We 
have merely noted that "fiscal capacity" can vary between jurisdictions as a 
result of different populations as well as different average incomes with 
identical populations. Provided that the goods provided by jurisdictional 
governments have some joint consumption properties, larger jurisdictions will 
provide larger public goods benefits to their citizens than will smaller 
jurisdictions, at the same tax rates. And this result is quite independent of 
our simplifying assumptions – either our use of Cobb-Douglas utility functions 
or our specification of the optimal public goods expenditure share as 50%. All 
that it depends on is the existence of net joint consumption elements in the 
goods that sub-national jurisdictions provide. 
But what is perhaps not entirely self-evident is just what a radical principle 
the IHE principle actually is in this setting. In order to identify its radical 
nature, it is necessary to go back to basics – to isolate the underlying logic of 
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fiscal equalization within a broader ' justice' framework. This framework has to 
be "individualistic" to be obedient to the spirit of Buchanan's own enquiry. 
And indeed, to underline the 'internal' nature of our critique here, we will 
formulate the argument in constitutional-contractarian terms.1 
2.3. IS FISCAL EQUALIZATION WARRANTED? 
In this spirit, suppose that individuals are behind the veil of ignorance, with full 
awareness of the jurisdictional structure of their inclusive polity, and the fact 
that individual gross-of-tax incomes will be equal. They know everything 
about everything except which sub-national jurisdiction they will inhabit. 
Under what circumstances will they be predicted to opt for fiscal equalization? 
The answer depends on the 'social welfare function' that agents will use to 
guide their decision-making behind the veil of ignorance. And here opinions 
differ on the extent to which greater aggregate utility is to be sacrificed to 
greater equality. John Rawls famously argues that individuals will choose 
"justly" in the sense that they will maximize the well-being of the worst-off 
person. In this simplified setting, where we have abstracted from disincentive 
effects, the Rawlsian scheme will require total equalization of both private 
goods consumption and public goods consumption. Full fiscal equalization will 
be required as part of that overall package.  
At the other extreme, John Harsanyi has argued that individuals will simply 
maximize expected well-being – an essentially utilitarian outcome. On the basis 
of this 'social welfare function,' it can be shown that all income will be allocated 
to the individuals in the larger jurisdiction. 
The central point here can be illustrated by sketching the utility possibilities 
frontier between the two jurisdictions. In doing so, it will be useful to generalize 
the formulation somewhat. Suppose jurisdiction S has s residents and jurisdiction 
L has l residents, where l > s . We also generalize the individuals' utility functions 
slightly, but retain the Cobb-Douglas functional form and assume identical 
preferences both within and across jurisdictions. 
It will be useful to prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: It will always maximize aggregate utility in any jurisdiction to equalize 
private goods consumption for all individuals within that jurisdiction. 
To see this, note that the object is to maximize: 
n.X
(1- )i α Gα  subject to [ ]Xi+G=kΣ  
                                                     
1 Even though Buchanan's contractarianism took shape explicitly only sometime after the 
early fiscal equalization work. 
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Taking partial derivatives and equalizing yields: 
Xiα = (1– α)/λ for all i.  
Which means that, to maximize aggregate utility, 
Xl = X2 = ... = Xn . 
This result is attributable to the fact that, when the utility function has constant 
returns to scale with a public good as one of the arguments, then there must 
be diminishing returns with respect to private goods consumption. 
On this basis, we can now depict the utility possibilities frontier between the 
two jurisdictions as given by AB in Fig 2. At point A, all private and public goods 
consumption is allocated to S. We know that aggregate expenditure in S will be 
distributed between X and G in proportions (1 – α) and α respectively. So if the 
total resource available is K, then per capita consumption of X in S is (1 – α)K/s. 
Aggregate utility in S will then be: 
(3)  s. [(1 – α)K/s] (1- )α .[αK]α 
or,  sα [(1 – α)K] (1- )α .[αK]α    
By analogous reasoning, aggregate utility when all of K is allocated to L is: 
(4)  lα [(1 – α)K] (1- )α .[αK]α 
Figure 2 
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Then the line AB will have slope of -( l/s)α as indicated, where l/s is the ratio of 
the populations of L and S. 
Now, we can depict in Figure 2 the 'social indifference curves'2 associated 
with a variety of normative positions – Utilitarian, Rawlsian, and any other 
'compromise contenders.' 
(i) The Utilitarian Case: The utilitarian social indifference curves can 
be represented diagrammatically by straight lines with slope of -1, as 
indicated by the lines u1 and u2 in Figure 2. Clearly, these have their 
maximum at the corner solution B3. In other words, aggregate utility will 
be maximized when all consumption of both public and private goods occurs in 
the larger jurisdiction.  
The reason for this result is straightforward. The fact of larger numbers 
in L makes public goods consumption cheaper per person in L than in S. 
Jurisdiction L is a more efficient location for the generation of utility than 
is jurisdiction S, and all consumption must accordingly be allocated to L. 
(ii) The Rawlsian Case: We can also depict the Rawlsian strict 
equalization scheme (maximin rather than leximin) in terms of 
rectangular social indifference curves whose corners lie along the 45° ray 
from the origin – illustrated in Figure 2 by u′1 . As indicated, these will 
always lead to equal per capita utility across jurisdictions, and will do so 
whatever the slope of the utility possibilities frontier, and so whatever the 
relative size of jurisdictions. 
So whether fiscal equalization is or is not warranted depends on the 
social welfare function formulation: the Rawlsian formulation requires 
total equalization; the Benthamite utilitarian requires a corner solution in 
which all public consumption (and with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, 
all private consumption as well) is allocated to the larger jurisdiction. 
It is of course widely recognized within the relevant literature what the 
diagrammatic representation in Figure 2 makes plain – namely, that Rawls and 
Bentham lie at the opposite ends of a notional spectrum along which is 
measured the weight of 'efficiency' (aggregate utility maximizing) 
considerations vis-à-vis 'equity' ones. It is therefore interesting to explore 
some 'middle ground' in which both considerations weigh to some extent. 
                                                     
2 It should be emphasized that these 'social indifference curves' are an exclusively ethical 
construction. They show the loci of points that are taken to be ethically equivalent, under the 
particular 'social welfare function' that individuals are presumed to choose in ideal 
circumstances behind the veil of ignorance. 
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(iii) The Nash Social Welfare Function: One such possibility is the 
Nash social welfare function in which the maximand is the product of 
individual utilities in the inclusive jurisdiction. The Nash social welfare 
function gives rise to ethical indifference curves of the form illustrated 
in Figure 2 by n1 . These curves are symmetric around the 45° ray from 
the origin. So if there were no 'aggregate utility effect' they would give 
rise to an ideal point on that 45° ray. 
In some ways the Nash social welfare function stands as a kind of mid-
point between the Rawlsian and Benthamite extremes. Suppose that 
there are efficiency advantages to having one individual as opposed to 
another consume. These advantages argue in favor of re-allocating 
consumption to the more 'efficient' utility-producer. But these are offset 
by the equity costs, in the sense that the less efficient utility-producer 
can never be made worse off than she would be if there had been no 
such efficiency advantages. The 'unitary elasticity' property of the Nash 
social welfare function means that an x% advantage to A's consumption 
means an x% increase in A's consumption – but there is not the total 
re-allocation to A that Bentham/Harsanyi would require. 
In the current case, then, the utility advantages associated with public 
goods consumption in L do not serve to make S residents any worse off 
than they would be if those utility advantages did not exist. But S 
residents do not derive any share of those aggregate utility gains either 
(as they clearly do under the Rawlsian formulation): those benefits 
accrue exclusively to residents of the larger jurisdiction. 
Under the Nash formulation, the maximand is 
(5)    W  =  {XS (1- )α .GSα}s.{XL.(1- )α  GLα}l  
Which is to be maximized subject to: 
(6)      [sXs + lXL + GS + GL – K] = 0 
Partially differentiating with respect to the various arguments, we get: 
(7)    dW/dXs = s(l – α)W/Xs – λs = 0 
(8)    dW/dXL = l(1 – α)W/XL – λl = 0 
(9)     dW/dGs = sαW/Gs – λ = 0 
(10)        and dW/dGL = lαW/GL – λ = 0 
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Accordingly, at the Nash welfare maximum: 
  Xs = XL 
and GS/s = GL/ l 
That is, private goods consumption should be equalized, but public 
goods consumption should be equalized per capita. Public goods 
expenditure will in other words be proportional to population. 
It is worth underlining the feature that is common between Nash and 
Rawls, and the feature that distinguishes them. Both involve equalization of 
private goods consumption across jurisdictions. But only Rawls involves fiscal 
equalization. The Nash social welfare function involves no fiscal equalization 
whatsoever, apart from that involved as an incidental feature of private goods 
equalization. In this sense, far from fiscal equalization involving weaker value 
judgements than "the distribution of fiscal burdens and benefits among 
unequals," as Buchanan suggests, fiscal equalization requires stronger value 
judgements. In other words, in order for fiscal equalization to be justified, the social 
welfare function formulation must embody a stronger commitment to equalization than is 
required for the equalization of private goods consumption. It must indeed embody a 
commitment to complete equalization of the kind characteristic of maximin. 
3. GENERALIZATIONS 
The foregoing analysis is developed in a context in which the case for 
equalization is driven by differential populations. The relevance of population 
here is derived from the assumption that the goods provided by jurisdictions are 
public within jurisdictions but have no inter-jurisdictional spillovers. The basic 
analysis is driven by a comparison of three alternative formulations of the social 
welfare function – one that allows for maximum 'efficiency' in the sense of 
expected aggregate utility, one that allows for maximum equality, and one that 
allows an equity-efficiency trade-off. But we have derived the results for a case 
where the individual utility functions are Cobb-Douglas. And we have abstracted 
from disincentive effects in both inter-personal and in inter-jurisdictional 
transfer. In particular, we have assumed that there is no inter-jurisdictional 
mobility, and therefore no efficiency calculus in relation to such mobility effects. 
In what follows, we want to defend our conclusions against the charge that 
they are sensitive to special features of the setting in which we have derived 
them. In this section, we want to make some modifications to the model to 
allow for some of these features, and suggest why we think that the results are 
robust to the particular simplifications we have made. 
Fiscal Equity In Federal Systems / 357
http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol6/iss3/art3
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1543
3.1. DEGREE OF PUBLICNESS 
Consider first our assumption that goods are purely public within jurisdictions. 
Suppose we generalize consumption of the public good in each jurisdiction 
by dividing G in each case by a factor sφ or lφ as appropriate. When φ = 0, the 
good is public within jurisdictions. When φ = 1, the good has no jointness in 
consumption at all. When φ > 1, the good is subject to net congestion. In this 
latter case, residents of the smaller jurisdiction will be better off. To provide 
identical benefits in both jurisdictions will require more public expenditure 
per capita in the larger than in the smaller jurisdiction – that is, any fiscal 
equalization that is called for will go from smaller to larger jurisdictions. 
It is clear, however, that the relaxation of the strict publicness assumption 
makes no difference to the qualitative results in either the Rawlsian or the 
Benthamite cases. In the Rawlsian case, the requirement remains that the 
utilities of all individuals be equalized: the calculation of the transfers required 
to secure that outcome will require estimation of the size of φ. And when φ > 1, 
the direction of transfers will change. But the basic logic remains intact. 
In the Benthamite case, all consumption of both private and public goods will 
be required to take place in the larger jurisdiction whenever φ < 1. When φ >1, all 
consumption should be shifted to the smaller jurisdiction. 
But what of the Nash case? In (5), W becomes: 
(11)   {XS(1- )α .(GS/sφ)α}s.{XL.(1- )α  (GL/lφ)α}l 
but the resource constraint (6) is unchanged. So, the publicness terms enter as 
constants, leaving equations (9) and (10) unaffected. Whatever the size of φ, 
equal per capita expenditure on public goods is required in each jurisdiction. 
Certainly, as φ increases, the utility levels of S-residents and L-residents diverge 
less. So the equity case for redistributing from S to L is less strong. But the 
aggregate utility loss involved in such transfers is also correspondingly smaller. 
The two effects exactly cancel out! And if φ > 1, the equal per capita spending 
rule still applies. It is just that S residents are better off than L residents. Thus, 
the property that there should be equal per capita public expenditure in the two jurisdictions is 
independent of the degree of publicness! 
This is a convenient feature of the Nash social welfare function formulation. 
It implies that we do not need to enquire as to the value of cp in order to 
settle on the appropriate public revenue distribution. 
3.2. UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
The assumption that individual utility functions have a Cobb-Douglas form is, of 
course, rather special and can in itself be justified only on the basis of analytic 
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simplicity. But experiments with alternative utility functions do not seem to alter 
the basic results. Suppose for example that the utility function is of the form: 
   Us = βXS + (1 – β)Gs  
 and analogously  UL = βXL + (1 – β )GL. 
Here, we revert to the assumption that G is a pure public good within 
jurisdictions. Because X and G are substitutable at a constant rate β/(1–β), then 
whether private good or public good should be consumed depends both on the 
value of β and the size of the community. 
If β > l/(l + 1), then a fortiori, β > s/(s + 1) only the private good should be 
consumed – in both jurisdictions. Questions of fiscal equalization don't arise. If 
β < l/(l +1), then aggregate utility maximization occurs when all consumption is 
on the public good and is undertaken in the larger jurisdiction. 
The Rawlsian maximin requirement will involve a division of resources 
between S and L such that: 
If s/(s + 1) < β < l/(l + 1), then resources are divided so that a 1/s share 
goes to the larger jurisdiction (and is all spent on the public good) 
while the remaining s/(s+1) share goes to the smaller jurisdiction and 
is all spent on the private good;  
If β <s/(s+1), then the total resource is divided in halves and each 
jurisdiction spends exclusively on the public good: fiscal equalization is 
complete. 
The Nash social welfare function requires: 
If s/(s + 1) < β < l/(l + 1), then only public good is consumed in L and 
only private in S. The maximand is therefore: 
W = [βXS]s.(1 – β) GLl 
Which is to be maximized subject to 
s.Xs + GL = K. 
This yields the solution that per capita expenditure should be equalized – 
though all resources are devoted to the public good in the larger 
jurisdiction, and all to the private good in the smaller jurisdiction. 
If s/(s + 1) > β, the same equal per capita expenditure result obtains, but 
all expenditure in both jurisdictions is on the public good. 
Of course, this discussion with a different utility function formulation is not 
sufficient to establish a general analytic result. But it is sufficient, we think, to 
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suggest that the results obtained in the Cobb-Douglas case are not just an 
artifact of the utility function simplifications we have adopted. 
3.3. FISCAL FEDERALISM AND OTHER EQUALIZATIONS 
The analysis here, like the original Buchanan discussion, has been directed 
specifically at the issue of equalization grants among sub-national political 
jurisdictions. It should be clear, however, that inequalities can arise from 
differential access to (different levels of) public goods supply, quite 
independently of the federalized political setting. A unitary government that is 
supplying goods that are public over geographical regions that are smaller than 
the total polity will confront the same kind of normative questions. And indeed 
those questions will arise for a jurisdictional government providing services 
that have economies (or diseconomies) of scale at a more local level. In all such 
cases the question arises: to what extent should sub-national public goods be 
supplied so that everyone, however remotely situated, has access to exactly the 
same level of public service – so the same access to higher education or 
medical services or operatic performances or whatever, irrespective of where 
she lives? A strictly egalitarian procedure (a Rawlsian social welfare function) 
will require just such equality of service. A strictly utilitarian ( 'efficiency'-based) 
rule will restrict public goods supply to those areas where the number of 
individuals who consume the public good is largest – that is, all public goods 
consumption will take place in the largest 'consumption' area! The Nash social 
welfare function will require equal private goods consumption, but public 
goods expenditure will be subject to an effective equal per capita rule. If the 
public good is indeed public in the strict Samuelsonian sense over its 
geographic range, then individuals living in more populous areas will get a 
proportionately higher level of public goods provision than those living in less 
populous areas – with the proportions determined precisely by population size. 
This will be one utility inequality that the Nash formulation, with its otherwise 
egalitarian spirit, will permit. So the results derived here apply to full politically 
federalized systems, to mere administrative 'federalism,' and to the policies of 
unitary states bearing on sub-national public goods. The extension of the 
principle of horizontal equity to fiscal residuals – including spending as well as 
taxing activities – and the application of that extended principle on an 
'inclusive' national basis involves very strong value judgements, and certainly 
rather stronger ones than the principles governing redistribution of private 
goods consumption. So if the latter principles are 'controversial ' then the 
principles governing fiscal equalization are more so! 
The basic conceptual point here is that contained in Figure 2. If it is, for 
whatever reason, cheaper to provide public benefits in some locations rather 
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than others, Rawls requires equal total real expenditure across locations, Nash 
equal per capita real expenditure across locations, and utilitarianism allocation 
of all expenditure to the cheapest source! If there are no such cost differences 
(i.e., AB in Figure 2 has a slope of -1) then private goods and public goods can 
be treated equally – fiscal equalization can be treated as a concomitant of 
general egalitarianism. But in all other cases, private goods equalization is 
required under a much wider range of underlying normative schemes than is 
full public goods benefits equalization. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The object of the current paper has been to interrogate the case that 
Buchanan makes for fiscal equalization within a federal system in his classic 
and highly influential 1950 paper. Like Buchanan, we adopt a rigorously 
'individualist' framework – one that treats individuals as the exclusive makers 
of 'justice-claims.' In particular, we explicitly set aside here the idea that 
jurisdictional governments as such make legitimate claims on the distribution 
of fiscal power (as does Buchanan in his original piece). Inter-jurisdictional 
inequalities will arise however because, absent any intervention from the 
central fiscal authority, there will typically be different levels of public 
expenditure in different jurisdictions. These differences reflect two possible 
sources: differences in average incomes between jurisdictions, on the one 
hand; and in any case where goods exhibit joint-consumption (or for that 
matter net congestion) properties, different populations on the other hand. 
Buchanan's argument addresses the former source of difference. We focus 
on the latter. But Buchanan's claims seem to be intended by him to be quite 
general, covering both. And in this connection, Buchanan asserts that: 
It is possible to treat the issue of fiscal equalization 'separately and in 
isolation' from the issue of private goods egalitarianism; The value 
judgments required for fiscal equalization are weaker than those 
required for private goods equalization. 
We dispute both claims. Once one insists on conceptualizing sub-national 
jurisdictions as nothing more than a collection of individuals bound together 
for common fiscal purposes, it is not clear how fiscal equalization can be 
separated from questions of inter-personal distributive 'justice,' treated tout 
court. In that setting, moreover, appeals to principles such as that of 'inclusive 
horizontal equity' on the grounds that they are less demanding normatively 
strike us as excessively intuitionist. As far as we can see, the only way to test 
out whether certain value judgements are weaker or stronger than others is 
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to postulate alternative social welfare function formulations and see which of 
those formulations demands what. The simple investigations we have 
conducted here indicate that full fiscal equalization requires the most extreme 
Rawlsian kind of social welfare function. Private goods equalization is however 
required under social welfare function formulations (like the Nash social 
welfare function) where egalitarian elements are considerably less extreme. 
What these various social welfare function formulations capture are the 
trade-offs between aggregate utility on the one hand and equality of individual 
utility levels, on the other. In the case where inequalities arise from differential 
population, there are 'aggregate utility' implications for transfers between 
jurisdictions. In the simple case where sub-national jurisdictions provide 
goods that are public within the jurisdiction, for example, aggregate utility is 
increased when public spending is increased in the more populous 
jurisdiction at the expense of public spending in the less populous. It is, in 
other words, cheaper to produce a given increase in aggregate utility in the 
larger jurisdiction. So fiscal equalization reduces aggregate utility at the same 
time as it makes utility levels between the two jurisdictions more equal. In the 
construction of the Buchanan model, no such reduction in aggregate utility 
occurs with private goods equalization across persons. 
Clearly we (like Buchanan) have here abstracted from complications arising 
on the incentive side of the fiscal transfer process. These possible incentive 
effects are of two broad kinds – those that arise from transfer-induced mobility 
between jurisdictions; and those that arise via disincentive effects in private 
goods markets associated with tax and transfer processes. There is a huge 
literature on the latter issue and a not insubstantial literature on the former as 
well. We do not deny that our results may be vitiated by these considerations 
to some extent. If for example the patterns of population distribution arising 
spontaneously are themselves 'inefficient,' say because of the transactions 
costs associated with (potential) exchanges among movers and non-movers, 
then it is surely not inconceivable that some fiscal equalization may be 
welfare-enhancing (Buchanan and Wagner (1971) and Buchanan and Goetz (1972), 
for example). Equally, if inter-personal transfers generate significant incentive 
effects, and if costs of moving are high, then it is not inconceivable that fiscal 
equalization may be a more efficient means of redistributing from residents of 
high income jurisdictions to residents of low income jurisdictions. 
But such reasoning is not the basis on which the original Buchanan argument 
is mounted. His object in the original paper was to show that a case could be 
made for fiscal equalization without any appeal to such considerations and 
without treating jurisdictions as anything more than a collection of 
individuals bound together for common fiscal purposes. It is that line of 
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argument that we have attempted to engage here. Buchanan's belief – and 
that of generations of public finance scholars influenced by him – seems to 
have been that, once the dependence of a jurisdictional citizen on the income 
(and number) of his fellows was noted, a simple case for fiscal equalization 
followed straightforwardly from uncontroversial premises. 
As we have argued here, we do not think that that is so. In order to 
disentangle the conceptual issues at stake here – to determine, that is, whether 
fiscal equalization can be justified in strictly individualistic terms – it seems to 
us appropriate to refer to simple 'social welfare function' formulations. 
Buchanan in other settings has been rather scathing about social welfare 
functions – partly for reasons that we ourselves share. But if an attempt is to be 
made to sort out the implicit assumptions about individualistic claims of justice 
and how they should weigh, then the only course seems to be to investigate 
just what the implicit terms of trade between aggregate utility and inter-
personal equality are under various arrangements – and this 'price' is 
precisely what alternative social welfare functions stipulate. The simple 
message of this paper is that when fiscal inequalities arise from differential 
population size (and/or cost differentials more generally), fiscal equalization 
commits one to a very extreme form of egalitarianism. Equalization of private 
goods consumption, without fiscal equalization, emerges from much weaker 
'social welfare functions.' In that sense, fiscal equalization emerges as the most 
demanding aspect, not the least, in any 'individualist' redistributive program. 
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